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CONTINUING THE TREND TOWARD EQUALITY:
THE ERADICATION OF RACIALLY AND SEXUALLY
DISCRIMINATORY PROVISIONS IN PRIVATE TRUSTS
Racially and sexually discriminatory private trusts are presumed to be valid
under traditional common law governing dispositions ofproperty. Most courts have
held that if the state plays a "passive" role, only private actors are involved and the
Fourteenth Amendment is not implicated The United States Supreme Court,
however, has declared in one context that discriminatory charitable trusts violate
public policy and are unconstitutional. This Note argues that because private trusts
involve unlawful state action and are not purely private, courts have an affirmative
obligation imposed by the Supreme Court and a moral responsibility because of
well-established public policy against racial and sexual discrimination to invalidate
discriminatory terms in private trusts.
INTRODUCTION
Patty MacElroy is a twenty-five year old white female. Her boyfriend of five
years (soon to be fianc6) is a twenty-seven year old African-American male named
Ben Jackson. Ben and Patty have encountered numerous obstacles to their interracial
relationship during the past five years. The most adamant opposition has come from
Patty's father. Due to his concern that his daughter might marry Ben, Edward
MacElroy III executed a new will to compound the adversity facing the devoted
couple. The will set up a testamentary trust composed of one-half of his entire estate
and named Patty as the beneficiary. One term of the trust imposed a condition that
if Patty married a black man the trust would revert to the residuary beneficiary
Richard Lewellan, Edward's yachting partner. Upon Patty's marriage to a white
male, however, she would continue to receive interest from the trust and could
receive distributions of the trust corpus upon showing sufficient need. By oversight,
Mr. MacElroy failed to appoint a trustee in his will. He died one month after its
execution; and the will was admitted to probate.'
This hypothetical demonstrates one form of egregious conduct on the part of private
individuals that can operate contrary to important social values such as equality and
abhorrence of discrimination. Another variation upon the example presented would entail the
appointment of a trustee in the decedent's will who is unwilling to perform the discriminatory
tasks set forth in the instrument. That situation also would place courts in a position to
enforce the discriminatory trust provisions by compelling the trustee to act according to its
terms. Should the appointed trustee refuse the appointment, the court would select a trustee.
See JESSE DUKEMiNIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 568 (5th
ed. 1995). This problem creates the same concerns as the situation in which the settlor of a
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Because the trust failed to name a trustee, the court administering the estate
during probate must perform that function. Under general rules of trust law, "[a]
trust will not fail for want of a trustee."2 Even if the court appoints a private
individual and not a public official or employee to manage the trust, the court
remains significantly involved in the supervision, administration, and enforcement
of the discriminatory trust provision. Without a trustee or the court's ability to supply
one, a resulting trust3 would arise and the corpus would revert to the decedent's only
heir, in this case, Patty.
Other scenarios in which Edward MacElroy could condition his bequest to his
daughter remain. If Mr. MacElroy had a son he might bequeath one-half of his estate
to his son outright and one-half to his daughter in trust with a reversion to his heirs
(in this case his son) should his daughter marry a black male. In such an instance,
the trust would be both racially and sexually discriminatory: MacElroy could limit
his disposition to his daughter while leaving his son free to alienate his property in
any way his son may choose. In addition, the marital limitation imposed on his
daughter forces her to discriminate against potential suitors because of their race.
The trustee administering and enforcing the trust by authority of the court also must
discriminate to avoid violating the terms of the trust. Courts should not compel such
spiteful and egregious conduct as private racial or gender discrimination."
trust simply failed to name a trustee.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
A resulting trust may arise when a disposition is incomplete or an express trust fails.
See id at 587.
4 This Note will not discuss trusts that discriminate on the basis of religion because
suggestions of limiting religious provisions raise serious conflicts between the Equal
Protection Clause and the right to free exercise of religion that this Note cannot address
adequately. The policy implications are not nearly as strong for eliminating provisions that
show preferences for one religion over another. See, e.g., Gordon v. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228
(Mass. 1955) (upholding a provision in a trust revoking a gift to children if they marry
outside the Jewish faith because the terms did not impose an unlawful restraint on marriage),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955). Only Pennsylvania and Virginia have contrary holdings
in similar cases in which courts found that the provisions mandated virtual prohibitions of
marriage. See id at 232 (citing Drace v. Klinedinst, 118 A. 907, 908 (Pa. 1922) (supporting
the same proposition); In re Devlin's Trust Estate,, 130 A. 238, 239 (Pa. 1925) (holding that
a "condition that a cestui que trust be reared in a certain faith ... [was] void as against public
policy"); see also Maddox v. Maddox's Adm'r, 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) 804, 814 (1854) (holding
that a bequest conditioned that the legatee "should be a member of any religious sect or
denomination, as directly violative of [public] policy"). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
also noted:
The policy of the law is to keep the alienation of land free from embarrassing
impediments, and it endeavors to strip devises and grants of restrictive
conditions, tending to fetter free disposition; therefore, if the language of the
condition is not clear, or is hostile to a state policy in any form, it is not given
effect.
[Vol. 7:3
CONTINUING THE TREND TOWARD EQUALITY
This Note challenges the traditional common law approach of affording
presumptive validity to private trusts that contain racially or sexually discriminatory
provisions. Part I sets forth Fourteenth Amendment requirements regarding and
relationship to private discrimination. Part II discusses courts' views of racially and
sexually discriminatory provisions in the contexts of private and charitable trusts,
including the primary way in which the courts have challenged, acquiesced in, or
expunged these racially and sexually discriminatory trust provisions previously. Part
III presents a brief review of the state action requirement under the Fourteenth
Amendment to expose the inadequacies of the strict causal nexus that courts
traditionally require for state action to violate Fourteenth Amendment protections.
Application of state action to discriminatory private trust provisions should reflect the
harmful effects of state sanction and enforcement of racial and gender discrimination
in light of strong public policies against discrimination and the impact trust
provisions have to compel others to discriminate. This section also proposes that the
Supreme Court's holding in Shelley v. Kraemer5 should extend to prevent private
discrimination in private trusts. Yet, as presented in Part IV, a test for determining
when express private trusts violate public policy and the Equal Protection Clause
must be based on the involvement of third party trustees and courts in active
discrimination. Private trusts involving third party trustees are never entirely private
enterprises or exercises of private rights; they converge with the public arena.
Part V considers a balance between testators' interests, the interests of future
generations, and societal interests in preventing discrimination. Under this balancing
test, states have affirmative duties and a moral responsibility to squelch racial and
sexual discrimination in trusts involving any degree of state action.6 The existence
of these duties demonstrates the necessity to apply state action analysis, as originally
contemplated in the CivilRights Cases,7 to private trusts. When courts accommodate
discrimination in such a manner, they circumvent the public policy rationale and the
antidiscrimination principles underlying the Fourteenth Amendment. Courts are
instruments of state action when they validate and enforce mechanisms for
Drace, 118 A. at 908.
5 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
6 But see Stephen R. Swanson, Discriminatory Charitable Trusts: Time for a Legislative
Solution, 48 U. PITT. L. REv. 153, 196-97 (1986) (arguing that legislative failure to regulate
private discriminatory trusts, even though the state regulates trusts in general, is not state
action reaching the ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment because the inaction only permits
the continuation of such trusts). This view is consistent with the proposition that private
execution creates and implements the discrimination, while state law only provides recourse
to the courts for administration, not enforcement. In other words, "[i]t compels no
discrimination." Id. at 183 (quoting In re Estate of Wilson, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 1237 (N.Y.
1983)). The central question remaining is whether the state action test should require strict
compulsion of discrimination rather than promotion through acquiescence or permission.
7 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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discrimination. This Note concludes by suggesting that the solution for these
problems involves the invalidation of discriminatory provisions in private trusts. In
this context, such public policy dictates the dynamics of equal protection.
I. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND PRIVATE DISCRIMINATION
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause prohibits
states, but not private individuals, from acting to deny persons due process or equal
protection in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.' The Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution provides:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.9
In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court decided that "[s]tate action of a particular
character ... is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject
matter of the amendment."'" This staunch refusal to consider private action as a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause permeates all state action analysis. Courts
have not invalidated discriminatory private trust provisions because the Fourteenth
Amendment does not prohibit purely private forms of discrimination. Many courts,
8 The United States Code also provides individuals with the basis for a cause of action
arising out of equal protection violations under the Fourteenth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1994). That section states, in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
Section 1983 requires an action be under color of law in order to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. This standard is the state action requirement under which a state, through its
executive, legislative, or judicial branches, acts to deprive individuals of their rights under
the Constitution. Purely private actors who impinge on the rights and liberties of others are
not subject to the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10 Shelley, 109 U.S. at 11. The state action doctrine developed after the Civil Rights
Cases were decided. According to the Supreme Court of Washington, "the fundamental
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was the eradication of slavery and racial
discrimination." Kennebec, Inc. v. Bank of the West, 565 P.2d 812, 814 (Wash. 1977) (en
banc).
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however, acknowledge a dichotomy between state action and state neutrality that
merely allows private individuals to act, despite the fact that those private actions are
highly discriminatory."
In 1948, however, the United States Supreme Court held in Shelley v. Kraemer
that the enforcement of discriminatory restrictions defined by private individuals was
unlawful state participation in the discrimination.'2 The judiciary has regressed in its
enforcement of public policy against discrimination since that decision. Refusal to
extend and apply the principles in the Shelley decision has led to state acquiescence
in and enforcement of racial and gender discrimination, particularly in the context of
private trusts. The judiciary acts to appoint trustees, to enforce trusts in accordance
with their terms, and to compel trustees to discriminate as trust provisions require,
therefore, those acts cross over the line dividing state neutrality from unlawful state
action. 3
Judicial or state enforcement of, promotion of, and explicit grant of authority for
private actors to discriminate based on race and gender in trust provisions
demonstrates the continuing need to reevaluate the state action doctrine in the trust
context. Trusts provide mechanisms for testators to impose their discriminatory
views upon the liberties of others and to compel others to discriminate in a testator's
place. Unfortunately, testators use thejudicial system to enforce that discrimination.
Recently, however, some courts have lowered the state action standard in cases
addressing racial discrimination. 4 Courts may invoke public policy considerations
to find state action more readily. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
stressed the offensiveness of racial discrimination to justify lesser state involvement
before finding unlawful state action in some circumstances: "[R]acial discrimination
is so peculiarly offensive and was so much the prime target of the Fourteenth
See King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 330 A.2d 1,4 (N.J. 1974) (understanding that the
Equal Protection Clause "'erects no shield' against purely private conduct (quoting Shelley,
334 U.S. at 13)).
" See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 23.
13 Unlike living trusts, testamentary trusts are subject to "the 'rigor mortis' of deadhand
control [which] is not present while a property owner is able to respond to persuasion and
evolving circumstances." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No.
2, 1999). For this reason, court action to continue and to perpetuate trusts containing
discriminatory provisions provides the requisite state action to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.
'" See Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120, 1127 (2d Cir. 1970); see also Taylor
v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 552 F. 2d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that
"[b]ecause of the generally recognized anathematic status of any government-sponsored
racial discrimination, for instance.... a lesser degree of state involvement is needed to meet
the state action requirement in cases alleging such discrimination" in a case involving a claim
of deprivation of property without due process by an electric company (citing Jackson v.
Statler Found., 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974))).
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Amendment that a lesser degree of involvement may constitute 'state action' with
respect to it than would be required in other contexts."'"
Discussion surrounding the application of the Equal Protection Clause, state
action analysis, and public policies encouraging the eradication of all forms of
discrimination in trust provisions have addressed these concepts primarily in the
context of charitable trusts. Unfortunately, most courts and commentators have failed
to extend the public policy abhorrence of discrimination to private trusts 16 that
contain discriminatory provisions.'7
A. Common Law Right of Disposition
Under the common law, testators and settlors have significant control over the
disposition of their property." The common law provides an unrestrained right to
devise property and presumes the validity of such private trusts despite provisions
which contravene equal protection guarantees under the Fourteenth Amendment,
state constitutional equal protection, and public policy.' 9 The right to dispose of
property is not a natural right, however, but arises out of state law.2" The right
Coleman, 429 F.2d at 1127.
16 Private trusts concern beneficiaries who usually are ascertainable (unless a testator
bequeaths his estate to unborn descendants), whereas charitable trust beneficiaries need not
be identifiable individuals. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 599.
"7 Some courts, however, have applied state action analysis under the Fourteenth
Amendment to trusts created for educational purposes that discriminate on the basis of race
and/or gender. See In re Certain Scholarship Funds, 575 A.2d 1325 (N.H. 1990); In re Estate
of Wilson, 452 N.E.2d 1228 (N.Y. 1983); First Nat'l Bank of Kansas City v. Danforth, 523
S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 1975); Milford Trust Co. v. Stabler, 301 A.2d 534 (Del. Ch. 1973); In re
Will of Potter, 275 A.2d 574 (Del. Ch. 1970).
IS Numerous cases cite traditional views of freedom of disposition. See Evans v. Newton,
382 U.S. 296, 315 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Certain Scholarship Funds, 575 A.2d
1325 (Brock, C.J., dissenting); Claflin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454, 456 (Mass. 1889). See also
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987), in which the Supreme Court presumed a fundamental
right to dispose of property by will or intestacy. Even after death, testators retain control over
future generations: "though death eliminates a man from the legal congeries of rights and
duties, this does not mean that his control, as a fact over the devolution of his property has
ceased. A legal person he may not be; but the law still permits his dead hand to control."
LEWIS M. SIMES, Should the Dead Hand Distribute: Free Will vs. Family, in PUBLIC POLICY
AND THE DEAD HAND 55, 60-61 (1955).
l The rule presuming validity at common-law states that "[t]here is no doubt but that it
is firmly established at common law that a testator may, within reason and good morals,
devise and bequeath his estate as he sees fit." Will of Potter, 275 A.2d at 580 (citing In re
Girard College Trusteeship, 138 A.2d 844 (Pa. 1958)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 570 (1958)
(holding that a state agency was unable to administer an orphanage created by will for poor
white male orphans without violating the Fourteenth Amendment).
20 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:2 (1997); Elias Clark, Charitable Trusts, The
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originated at common law in England, but the Statute of Wills later codified the right
to devise certain lands by will in 1540.21
Legislatures later began limiting the right to devise property further and defining
stricter public policies to govern the inalienability of property22 and dead hand
control.' One major concern about alienability arose because the "dead hand" of a
testator or settlor inevitably would extend to "'enforce his will in distant future
generations[,] destroy[] the liberty of other individuals, and presume[] to make rules
Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of Stephen Girard, 66 YALE L.J. 979, 996 (1957). The
Court of Appeals of Indiana asserted in a will dispute (a statutorily granted right) that "[it
has long been held in Indiana that the right to take property by devise and descent is a
creature of statute." In re Estate of Wilson, 610 N.E.2d 851, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (citing
Donaldson v. State ex rel Honan, 101 N.E. 485 (Ind. 1913)).
One issue raised by the codification of the common law into state statutes that grant the
freedom of disposition is determining the point at which the common law becomes state
action. The majority of courts have held that mere codification of the common law into
statutory form is not state action in itself. See, e.g., King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 330
A.2d 1, 6-7 (N.J. 1974).
For a discussion of the evolution of thought concerning the common law of contracts
and prohibition of discrimination in that context, see Neil G. Williams, Offer, Acceptance,
and Improper Considerations: A Common-Law Model for the Prohibition of Racial
Discrimination in the Contracting Process, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 183 (1994), which
explores the means through which the common law of contracts can prohibit racial
discrimination and asks "why state common law should prohibit racial discrimination even
though there are already federal (and, in some cases, state) statutes that do so." Id. at 185.
2 See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 564. Prior to the Statute of Wills,
primogeniture dictated that property descend to the eldest son. The concept of the use or trust
emerged out of the division between courts of law and equity. Courts of law refused to
enforce the duties of a feofee to uses, so settlors turned to courts of equity to compel the
performance of duties pursuant to a use. In 1535, the Statute of Uses executed the use and
placed legal title in the hands of the beneficiary. See id. The concept of the active trust
developed from the Statute of Uses by giving active duties to trustees. The modem trust
remains an outgrowth of active trusts. See id Indeed, "[tihe power to dispose of property at
death is a privilege granted by law and supervised through probate and administration by
courts and judicially appointed fiduciaries." Clark, supra note 20, at 1003. The ministerial
actions of the state are inseparable from the process of property disposition.
22 Limitations imposed on property by a "dead hand" often prohibited individuals from
investing freely or using it for purposes other than capital investments. See SIMES, supra note
18, at 60-61. Lack of alienability also created concerns over waste.
23 See LEWIS M. SIMES, The Policy Against Perpetuities: Dead Hand vs. Alienability, in
PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 32, 33 (1955). See In re Liberman, 18 N.E.2d 658
(N.Y. 1939) (holding that testamentary conditions in partial restraint of marriage are not
against public policy as long as they do not impose unreasonable or prohibitive restraints);
In re Haight's Will, 64 N.Y.S. 1029 (N.Y. App. Div. 1900) (holding that the condition of a
trust paying the legatee as long as he remained with his present wife was not void as against
public policy).
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for distant times.""'a Professor Simes also considered that "[i]t is socially desirable
that the wealth of the world be controlled by its living members and not by the
dead."25 In one sense, the Rule Against Perpetuities sought to balance the interests
of different generations in liberty over property and demonstrate the tension between
the freedom of disposition and the liberties of future generations to receive property
unrestricted.26
Because the right to dispose of property freely at death originates from state law
extensions of privilege to citizens, it is an anomaly that private individuals can use
the privilege that a fiduciary enforces to effectuate purposes so clearly contrary to
constitutional rights of liberty and public policy against racial and gender
discrimination. Public policy should govern the development of state law and
mandate the invalidation of racially and sexually discriminatory terms in private
trusts. The New York Court of Appeals has followed this rationale and
acknowledged that "[alnalysis [of a trust] starts with the general rule that the law
permits a person possessing testamentary capacity to dispose of property to any
person in any manner and for any object or purpose so long as such disposition is not
illegal or against public policy."'27 In addition, the latest Tentative Draft of the
Restatement (Third) of the Law of Trusts reflects some willingness to limit "socially
undesirable" trust provisions by providing courts the discretion to invalidate trust
terms because of conflicts with public policy:28 "Thus, although one is free to give
property to another or to withhold it, it does not follow that one may give in trust with
whatever terms or conditions one may wish to attach."29
The common law provides a testator with several devices to effectuate his control
over property after death. These methods of restraint on future generations include
24 SIMES, supra note 18, at 59 (quoting JOSEF KOHLER, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Adalbert
Albrecht trans., MacMillan 1921)).
25 Id. (discussing the implications of societal changes on trust provisions). Professor
Simes relates examples of absurdities such as failing to wear stockings in public or failing
to become a citizen of England as conditions for beneficial interests in trusts. In regard to
these provisions, he recognizes "[b]ut as the world moves and society changes, their
enforcement becomes little short of absurd. It is true, some of them may be struck down by
another doctrine of the common law, namely, that conditions against public policy are void."
SIMES, supra note 18, at 62-63.
26 The rule balanced the testator's or settlor's interest in an unhampered or unrestricted
right to devise property and the desires of future generations to be free from restrictions on
the property interests. See SIMES, supra note 18, at 58-59.
27 In re Estate of Walker, 476 N.E.2d 298, 300 (N.Y. 1985) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
28 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999).
29 Id Section 29 and the comments following it, however, fails to list or discuss racially
or sexually discriminatory trust provisions specifically in section 29 which provides a means
for courts to invalidate trust provisions that are "otherwise contradictory to public policy."
Id. §29(b).
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wills, trusts, conditional bequests, special limitations, and future interests.3" One
problem that arose with the increased use of trusts to avoid the probate system was
the inability of the judiciary to classify trusts in ways to limit and expunge their use
for capricious or whimsical purposes. Professor Clark raised this issue in his article
dealing with charitable trusts and the Fourteenth Amendment: "While society
understandably favors protection of the ability to create trusts in general, this attitude
does not furnish a basis for tolerating specific trusts that are whimsical, eccentric and
now discriminatory. However, the courts have found no way to make an effective
classification"'" to restrict such uses. Recent trends in the law governing charitable
trusts, however, reflect a movement toward judicial intolerance of racial and gender
discrimination and away from liberal rules of construction deferential to every whim
of the testator. Despite the recent development allowing courts the discretion to
invalidate trust provisions that are contrary to public policy in the tentative
Restatement (Third) of the Law of Trusts, courts currently are resisting extension of
these public policy rationales to noncharitable private trusts.32
II. RACIALLY AND SEXUALLY DISCRIMINATORY TRUST PROVISIONS
In re Estate of Wilson33 represents the trend, in the context of private charitable
trusts, for courts to deviate from discriminatory trust terms and effectuate the
charitable purposes of trusts despite the presence of those discriminatory provisions.
In Wilson, the New York Court of Appeals held that a gender-restrictive private
charitable testamentary trust providing scholarships for five young men from
Canastota High School, three with the highest grades in science and two with the
highest grades in chemistry, for use during their first year of college did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court's rationale for
this holding was that the trust simply enlisted state aid to allow continuation of
private discrimination: 34 "When a court applies trust law that neither encourages, nor
affirmatively promotes, nor compels private discrimination but allows parties to
engage in private selection in the devise or bequest of their property, that choice will
not be attributable to the State and subjected to the Fourth Amendment's strictures."3
In addition, the court held that the judiciary, using its power of deviation, also could
30 See SIMES, supra note 23, at 32.
"' Clark, supra note 20, at 997.
32 Specifically, courts have resisted application of public policy to private trusts involving
slighter forms of judicial participation, including ministerial roles of supervision and/or
administration.
" 45 N.E.2d 1228 (N.Y. 1983).
14 See id. at 1234-37.
31 Id. at 1231.
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appoint a private successor trustee in place of the school board without violating
Equal Protection.36
The court in Wilson reasoned that "[a] court's application of its equitable power
to permit the continued administration of the trusts involved in these appeals falls
outside the ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment., 37 The rationale behind the Wilson
decision was that courts were not compelling discrimination by allowing the
administration of the trust to continue and providing the means for it to do so. 3 ' Trust
law, however, remains a state-regulated field. The privilege to create trusts and
dispose of property emanates specifically from rights granted under common law and
codified by state law.39 For this reason, the acquiescent application of trust law to
allow the continuance of racial and sexual discrimination by private actors raises
serious concerns of Fourteenth Amendment violations under both the federal and
state constitutions. To allow the trust incorporating gender-based discrimination to
continue, the New York Court of Appeals had to appoint a successor trustee to the
school board who would discriminate as the trust required.4° This cold-shoulder
approach has created a mistaken per se perception that the Fourteenth Amendment
does not apply to discriminatory private trust provisions.
Private trusts are not purely private. Private actors do supply the funds which are
subject to the restrictive provisions, and private actors do bring their own intentions
to disposition to the trust instruments. The traditional assumption, however, that
private trusts only involve nominal administrative acts that do not amount to state
action is erroneous. States do promote the continuation of discrimination actively
when they furnish the mechanism by which private actors accomplish racial and
gender discrimination.
The New York Court of Appeals in Wilson exercised its own discretion as a state
actor to appoint a new trustee and leave the trust terms that discriminated on the basis
of gender. The court just as easily could have applied the doctrine of cy pres rather
than deviation to article six of the trust to replace "men" with "persons."'" In that
way, the court could have supported the underlying charitable purpose of the
educational trust without discriminating against female candidates. Instead, the court
sanctioned the gender discrimination by appointing a successor trustee after explicitly
acknowledging and disavowing the state's "important public policy" to eradicate
36 See id. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire declined to follow the Wilson holding
in In re Certain Scholarship Funds, 575 A.2d 1325, 1329 (N.H. 1990).
37 Wilson, 452 N.E.2d at 1237.
38 See id.
'9 See id; supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
40 See id. at 1234.
41 Id. at 1232.
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gender-based discrimination "in education, employment, housing, credit, and many
other areas."42
In addition, state constitutions do not demand the strict standards for state action
found in the federal Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. In contexts other than
discriminatory trust provisions, New Jersey courts have held that its state
constitutional guarantees of equal protection are "not expressly directed against state
action [and] have been held to protect citizens against encroachments against their
rights by wholly private conduct." '43
A. Insufficiency of Traditional Trust Law to Invalidate Discriminatory Trust
Provisions
Traditional trust law governing charitable trusts has developed more quickly than
that dealing with private trusts by considering the implications of discriminatory
provisions. Courts apply liberal rules of construction and interpretation to charitable
trusts because they provide benefits to the public or gifts to charitable organizations
that states want to encourage and preserve." Because the law favors charitable trusts,
they "are often upheld where a private trust would fail."45 Courts afford generous
privileges to charitable trusts by exempting them from the Rule Against Perpetuities,
giving tax exemptions and gift and estate tax deductions, and possibly exempting
charitable trusts from inheritance and ad valorem property taxes.46
The lenient rules governing charitable trusts developed from societal interests
encouraging philanthropy. Indeed, "[a]t one time in England, a charitable disposition
had to conform to rigid standards of public policy."47 The English King's courts
exercised their broad powers of reform to maintain strict adherence to these public
policies in the uses of trusts.48 The charitable purposes that trusts can benefit include:
"(a) the relief of poverty; (b) the advancement of education; (c) the advancement of
religion; (d) the promotion of health; (e) governmental or municipal purposes; and
(f) other purposes the accomplishment of which is beneficial to the community."9
42 Id. at 1233.
" King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 330 A.2d 1, 18 (N.J. 1974) (citing Cooper v. Nutley
Sun Printing Co., 175 A.2d 639 (N.J. 1961) (wrongful discharge)); see Gray v. Serruto
Builders, Inc., 265 A.2d 404 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1970) (apartment rental).
4" See First Nat'l Bank of Kansas City v. Danforth, 523 S.W.2d 808, 817 (Mo. 1975).
'5 Id at 817 (citing Burrier v. Jones, 92 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Mo. 1966); Ervin v. Davis, 199
S.W.2d 366, 368 (Mo. 1947)).
46 See Mary Kay Lundwall, Inconsistency and Uncertainty in the Charitable Purposes
Doctrine, 41 WAYNE L. REv. 1341 (1995).
47 Clark, supra note 20, at 995 (citing 2 GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 432 (1935)).
41 See id.
49 Shenandoah Valley Nat'l Bank of Winchester v. Taylor, 63 S.E.2d 786, 789 (Va.
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Because of the unique nature of charitable trusts, courts are more willing to reform
their terms to preserve generally charitable gifts. This pattern of reformation has not
extended to private trusts yet.
The increasing intolerance of any form of discrimination, not just racial
discrimination, has led the movement to seek changes in traditional trust law
concerning private trusts. The conflicting interests of society to promote
philanthropy and, at the same time, to eradicate discrimination are juxtaposed in the
trust context. Until recently, courts refused to invalidate discriminatory private trusts
using principles founded in traditional trust law, equal protection, and public policy.
An established trust law doctrine such as cy pres emerged as one means for courts to
justify reformation of charitable trusts to exclude racially and sexually discriminatory
terms due to equal protection violations. Unfortunately, these mechanisms are not
as conducive in their application to private trusts.
B. Charitable Trusts and the Doctrine of Cy Pres
Charitable trusts are supposed to benefit public communities. The major
dilemma arising with the use of racially and sexually discriminatory provisions in
such trusts is their conflict with public policy prohibiting discrimination. This
problem became most evident in the context of discriminatory trusts set up for
educational purposes.5" In Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of Philadelphia", the
Supreme Court first considered the use of a trust that erected a college for the benefit
of "poor white male orphans."52 The Court held that the trust violated the Fourteenth
Amendment by denying admission to the college solely because of race.53
The doctrine of cy pres focuses on the reformation of dispositive provisions
containing illegal purposes in charitable trusts, while attempting to preserve the
1951).
50 For an in-depth discussion of the issues surrounding the use of traditional trust law and
public policy rationales to eradicate racial and sexual discrimination in charitable trusts, see
Swanson, supra note 6. Professor Swanson recognizes the failure of traditional trust law to
achieve equal treatment in trusts. See id. at 166. He also asserts that "[d]espite this strong
public policy against racial discrimination, apparently no court has invalidated a racially
discriminatory trust on grounds of public policy." Id. at 160.
See also Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971) (holding that private
schools that exercise racial discrimination are not entitled to a federal tax exemption), aff'd
sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971); In re Certain Scholarship Funds, 575 A.2d
1325, 1328-30 (N.H. 1990) (holding that an educational trust established for the benefit of
"Protestant boys" must be reformed using the doctrine of cy pres to remove the gender and
religious terms).
51 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
52 Id. at231.
13 See id. Though the Court did not address the issue, the trust also discriminated against
females by restricting admission to male applicants.
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general charitable intent of the testator.54 The doctrine only applies to charitable, not
private trusts; and allows courts to extend the beneficence of the testator to a purpose
other than that designated in the trust." The Restatement (Second) of Trusts provides
that the doctrine of cy pres may apply
[i]f property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable
purpose, and it is or becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to
carry out the particular purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more
general intention to devote the property to charitable purposes, the trust
will not fail but the court will direct the application of the property to
some charitable purpose which falls within the general charitable
intention of the settlor.56
In her article considering charitable trusts and the Fourteenth Amendment,
Professor Richelle Searing discusses "the state's discretionary power to modernize
discriminatory trusts under the cy pres doctrine."57 The prevailing perception of these
trusts shows that courts no longer use trust law as a mechanism to eliminate
discrimination.5" Instead, Fourteenth Amendment violations provide courts with the
means to effectuate change. 59 The test to invalidate racially discriminatory charitable
trusts has become the degree of state involvement or entwinement with the
discrimination.
Judicial inaction through refusal to apply the cy pres doctrine becomes just as
poignant and compelling a means of state action favoring discrimination as direct
action or enforcement of those provisions.6' Even apparent neutral actions of the
judiciary, such as appointing private trustees for previous state agent trustees, have
been found to violate the Equal Protection Clause.61 The same principle of neutrality
" See In re Estate of Wilson, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 1234 (N.Y. 1983); See also Daloia v.
Franciscan Health Sys. of Cent. Ohio, Inc., 679 N.E.2d 1084, 1091 (Ohio 1997) (arguing that
the doctrine of cy pres is the "saving device" of charitable trusts and enumerating equitable
circumstances when it applies as a rule of construction).
" See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 cmt. a (1959).
56 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399. "Cy Pres" means "as near" in Norman
French. See In re Certain Scholarship Funds, 575 A.2d 1325, 1332 (N.H. 1990). According
to the Restatement, the overriding purpose of the doctrine is to carry out the purpose of the
testator "'as nearly as' possible. 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 cmt. a; see
also Smith v. Moore, 225 F. Supp. 434, 441 (E.D. Va. 1963) (holding that the court should
honor the intent of the testator).
Richelle E. Searing, Note, Discriminatory Charitable Trusts: The Rule of
Approximation and the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 CONN. PROB. L.J. 279, 280 (1989).
58 See id. at 282.
9 See id.
60 See id. at 288.
6 See In re Girard's Estate, 127 A.2d 287 (Pa. 1956).
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applies to the application of some reformative or expunging doctrine to eliminate the
discriminatory provisions. Professor Richard Raskin, contemplating the effect of
judicial inaction and the present "shifting and enigmatic body of case law" that
should mold constitutional evaluation of discriminatory trust issues contends:
The advantage of the rule proposed above62 is that it recognizes the
functional equivalence of a judicial command to discriminate and the
judicial substitution of an actor who may discriminate for one who may
not. Moreover, it encourages courts faced with alternative methods of
effectuating charitable bequests to choose the course of nondiscrimination
and dissuades them from facilitating the administration of discriminatory
trusts.63
The court in Wilson erroneously refused to classify any involvement of judicial
action in a situation in which the court actively intervened and supplied a mechanism
for the fulfillment of the discriminatory provision of the trusts. The court
propounded notions of "neutral regulation" by the state and "voluntary adherence"
to the terms of the trust.' Only when state action rose to the level of direct use of the
coercive power of the state to enforce a discriminatory provision would the court
agree to recognize equal protection and due process dilemmas. 6' Because judicial
enforcement and state action are ambiguous and amorphous principles governing
constitutional issues, courts must regard the well-established public policies favoring
equality under the law and frown upon any form of discrimination to develop
restrictive, rather than deferential, tests for private discriminatory trust provisions.'
62 Raskin proposes that a better rule for the court in Wilson in light of the facts of the case
would state:
When management of a discriminatory charitable trust becomes impossible due
to a state official's refusal to participate in discrimination, and the trustee
petitions a court for instructions, the court must exercise its equitable
modification powers, if at all, to remove the discriminatory provisions. If
modification would violate the testator's general charitable purposes, the trust
should be permitted to fail. Any other course is judicial state action violative of
the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment.
Richard Raskin, Recent Case, 53 U. CIN. L. REv. 297, 318 (1984).
63 Id. (footnote added).
4 See In re Estate of Wilson, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 1236 (N.Y. 1983).
65 See id.; see also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (hesitating to find
governmental regulation concerning private acts sufficient state action).
66 See Raskin, supra note 62, at 318 (suggesting a new principle ofjudicial enforcement
contrary to the application the court used in Wilson).
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2. Private Trusts and Deviation
Traditional trust law does not provide an equitable means for courts to reform
discriminatory private trusts. Cy pres does not apply to express private trusts.
Another mechanism available for courts to use at their discretion to modify certain
terms of a trust is the doctrine of deviation. The doctrine of deviation, although
equitable, differs from the cy pres doctrine in two major ways. Deviation applies to
private and charitable trusts alike. Deviation, however, only permits changes to
incidental requirements in the terms of a trust such as the alteration of administrative
provisions." - The Restatement (Second) of Trusts also provides specifically for
deviation from the terms of private trusts in certain circumstances.68 These
circumstances include impossibility,69 illegality,7" contradiction with public policy,7
and changes in circumstances not anticipated by the settlor.72 Deviation may apply
even when compliance injures the interests of the beneficiary." Section 166 of the
Restatement also provides that "[t]o the extent to which a term of the trust doing
away with or limiting duties of the trustee is against public policy, the term does not
affect the duties of the trustee." '74 This doctrine incorporates the notion that trusts
should not be enforced when they act against public policy.75 Typically, the deviation
doctrine does not alter the central provisions of a trust's purpose. Because deviation
gives courts a narrower power to alter trusts than the power of cy pres, courts use
deviation more liberally.76 Because the doctrine is strictly limited to use on
67 See id
68 See I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 165-67 (1959). In an analogous
provision with a more limited scope applicable to charitable trusts the Restatement states:
The court will direct or permit the trustee of a charitable trust to deviate from a term of
the trust if it appears to the court that compliance is impossible or illegal, or that owing
to circumstances not known to the settlor and not anticipated by him compliance would
defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust.
Id. § 381. The latest Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts includes a more
expansive section allowing the invalidation of trust terms contrary to public policy. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999).
69 See id. § 165.
70 See id. § 166.
71 See id.
72 See id. § 167.
13 See id. § 166(2).
14 Id. § 166(3).
" See id. §62 (stating under the heading "Enforcement against Public Policy" that "[a]
trust or a provision in the terms of a trust is invalid if the enforcement of the trust or
provision would be against public policy, even though its performance does not involve the
commission of a criminal or tortious act by the trustee"). See also id. § 166 cmt. b ("A trustee
is not bound by a term of the trust which directs him to do an act, although the act itself is not
criminal or tortious, if it is against public policy to compel the performance of such an act.").
76 See Daloia v. Franciscan Health Sys. of Cent. Ohio, Inc., 679 N.E.2d 1084, 1092 (Ohio
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administrative provisions in private trusts, however, it fails to provide courts any
means to reform the substantive provisions of discriminatory private trusts. Due to
the failure of traditional means of modification, courts must use public policy to
effectuate this end. Using a new public policy standard, courts could refuse to
enforce trust provisions in private trusts that contain restrictions contrary to public
policy."
7
III. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, STATE ACTION, AND PRIVATE TRUSTS
Very few limitations restrict the freedom of disposition. As long as individuals
do not run afoul of Fourteenth Amendment guarantees and other statutory limitations
they may create any form of testamentary disposition. Traditionally, such dispositions
may discriminate even on the basis of race or gender. This deferential view toward
settlors' rights simply has lost its place when racial or sexual discrimination are
concerned. Abhorrence of discrimination in general has led courts to limit private
discrimination in a number of contexts.
The most poignant issue involving application of the Fourteenth Amendment to
private discrimination is state action. According to most courts, "judicial
administration of [a] private trust [is] not state action;" ' therefore, discriminatory
private trusts do not fall within the ambit of Fourteenth Amendment protection. As
applied to charitable trusts, however, traditional views of state action analysis under
the Fourteenth Amendment change. State action increases beyond merely ministerial
tasks when courts are forced to administer and to monitor the progress of charitable
1997) (applying the doctrine of deviation to a private trust in order to substitute a new
hospital as a beneficiary after the hospital originally intended as the beneficiary closed).
77 The Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 62 already provides this power to courts, but the
judiciary has refused to exercise it.
78 Clark, supra note 20, at 1007 n.108 (citing Gordon v. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228 (Mass.)
(holding that a will provision revoking the gift should the testator's son marry outside of the
Jewish faith was not vague as to be unenforceable), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955)); see
also United States Nat'l Bank v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860 (Or. 1954) (affirming a decision
that
a testamentary provision requiring as a condition precedent to beneficiary's
taking, that she prove that she had not, before age of 32, embraced a particular
religious faith or married a man of that faith, was neither an invasion of
beneficiary's right to religious freedom, nor unconstitutional discrimination, nor
a violation of public policy arising from either category).
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trusts.79 In some instances, state departments or governmental bodies serve as the
trustees of charitable trusts.80
No dispositive test exists for determining when sufficient state action exists to
violate the Fourteenth Amendment in the context of private discrimination."' The
79 See Clark, supra note 20, at 1003, 1008. In addition, state courts must find that a
general charitable purpose exists within the trust for it to become operative and qualify to
receive benefits accorded such trusts. See id at 1003-04. The practice of court administration
and establishment of trusts as charitable applies equally to inter vivos charitable trusts which
come into existence through their own operation during the life of the settlor. Until state
courts define them as "charitable," inter vivos trusts are not accorded privileges either. See
id. at 1004 n.95. The law favors charitable trusts by exempting them from the Rule Against
Perpetuities and according them favorable tax status. See In re Estate of Wilson, 452 N.E.2d
1228, 1232 (N.Y. 1983).
80 See Pennsylvania v. Board of Dirs. of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957) (relating that
the trustee was the Philadelphia Board of Directors of City Trusts, a state agency), rev 'g In
re Girard's Estate, 127 A.2d 287 (Pa. 1957); Pennsylvania v. Brown, 270 F. Supp. 782 (E.D.
Pa. 1967) (reporting the same agency as trustee).
8 See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967) (advocating a case by case
determination, based on the facts and circumstances of each situation, of whether state action
exists). Courts have proposed numerous approaches to state action analysis in the context of
private trusts. The Supreme Court of Missouri recognized four theories for determining the
quality of state action: the public arena theory, the state function theory, the state property
theory, and the sifting facts and weighing circumstances theory. See First Nat'l Bank of
Kansas City v. Danforth, 523 S.W.2d 808, 819 (Mo. 1975), cert. denied, Sutt v. First Nat'l
Bank of Kansas City, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); Lakeside Hosp. Ass'n v. First Nat'l Bank of
Kansas City, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975).
The public arena theory stands for the proposition that when municipal control has
been established firmly, the mere substitution of trustees will not transfer automatically from
the public to the private sector and thus avoid the mandates of the Constitution. See Evans
v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966) (holding that the restriction of use of a public park to
the white population of the city of Macon violated "the public policy of the United States of
America and violat[ed] ... the Constitution and laws of the State of Georgia"); Searing,
supra note 57, at 290.
The state function theory (usually employed in cases in which only whites were allowed
to vote in a political primary) applies when private individuals assume functions traditionally
reserved to public services. See Nixon v. Herdon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). Public function is
not a per se rule or determination when an activity falls within the ambit of the government.
"[H]istory of governmental activity" in the area remains dispositive. Searing, supra note 57,
at 291 (citing Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (considering that a
warehouseman's proposed sale of goods in his care was not fairly attributable to the State of
New York)). Public functions in the administration of private trusts could include the entire
probate process, disposition of property, assignment of a trustee by the court, monitoring the
progression of the trust, and interpreting and enforcing the provisions of the trusts. When
testators take responsibility for disposing of property they assume the role of the state which
has been granted to individuals through this privilege. The state still provides for its own
disposition through intestacy laws.
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general standard provides that "'the conduct allegedly causing deprivation of a
federal right [must be] fairly attributable to the state."' ' 2 The threshold to determine
when private action becomes sufficiently entwined with state action to violate the
Fourteenth Amendment is undetermined. 3 Yet, the Supreme Court has observed that
"[p]rivate discrimination may violate equal protection of the law when accompanied
by State participation in, facilitation of, and in some cases, acquiescence in the
discrimination. ' 4
A. In the Aftermath of Shelley v. Kraemer
In Shelley v. Kraemer,85 the Supreme Court refused to enforce a racially
restrictive covenant between private individuals because such enforcement would
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 Thirty-nine caucasian property owners entered
into an agreement that restricted the use and transfer of fifty-seven lots in a St. Louis,
Missouri neighborhood for fifty years.8" The covenant at issue prohibited the
occupancy or ownership of property of those fifty-seven parcels of land by African-
Americans.
The dispute in the case arose from a contract to sell one of the lots subject to the
restrictive covenant at issue to a black couple, the Shelleys8 Community members
sought to enforce the convenant and divest the Shelleys of the title to their new
The state property theory has lost prevalence in state action analysis. See Hampton v.
City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, Ghioto v. Hampton, 371 U.S. 911
(1962).
The sifting facts and weighing circumstances theory requires courts to engage in a fact-
specific analysis to determine whether state action is involved. See Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). Under this theory, courts must look to evidence
beyond the four comers of the trust document and consider all of the latent and possible ways
the state may be involved with a private trust.
82 Wilson, 452 N.E.2d at 1235 (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937
(1982)). The New York Court of Appeals even acknowledged that "[iut is argued before this
court that the judicial facilitation of the continued administration of gender-restrictive
charitable trusts violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id at
1235.
83 See Burton, 365 U.S. at 722.
84 Wilson, 452 N.E.2d at 1235. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Shapiro v.
Columbia Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 576 S.W.2d 310, 318 (Mo. 1978) (drawing the line
for state action when the nexus between the state becomes a "joint participant" or "so
entwined" in the action that the state assumes a "position of interdependence"), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 831 (1979).
85 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
86 See id. at 23.
87 See id. at 4-5.
88 See id at 5.
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home. 9 The Court specifically acknowledged that action by "state legislatures or city
councils" 9 was not involved in the circumstances of the case; however, "the
particular patterns of discrimination and the areas in which the restrictions are to
operate, are determined... by the terms of agreements among private individuals."'"
In this landmark case, the Court refused to enforce a purely private agreement
because doing so involved a state mandate of discrimination. Though the agreement
in itself did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because it was purely private
discrimination, 92 Court compulsion of the racial discrimination blatantly violated
equal protection guarantees. The Court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects many civil rights, including "rights to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of
property."'93 The uniqueness of the facts in Shelley and the distinction that the Court
drew between state enforcement of private agreements for discrimination contradict
the traditional view that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit any form of
private discrimination.
The holding in Shelley appeared to extend the initial prohibition the Supreme
Court established against state action of any and all kinds in the promulgation of
discrimination.94 The distinction in Shelley from prior cases considering state or
judicial enforcement of discrimination was that the racial discrimination in that case
arose out of a purely private agreement.9' The Court found that "the purpose of the
agreements were secured only by judicial enforcement by state courts of the
restrictive terms of the agreements." 96 The Court specifically rejected the
respondents' argument that the state involvement was too attenuated in that instance
to constitute impermissible state action,97 because the Court included actions of state
courts and judicial officers in proceedings among the forms of state action that
violate the guarantees of the Constitution.9"
The factual situation involved in Shelley is analogous to thejudicial enforcement
or administration of a private trust containing discriminatory provisions. Though
some courts have claimed that they have no affirmative obligation to prevent private
discrimination,99 the Court in Shelley did make clear that "when the effect of that
'9 See id at 6.
90 Id. at 12.
9' Id. at 13.
92 See id. at 9 (stating that the issue in the case was the judicial enforcement of the
restrictive covenant, not the validity of the private agreement itself); id. at 13 (finding that
the convenant alone did not violate any rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment).
9 Id. at 10.
94 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
9' See id. at 13.
96 Id. at 13-14 (emphasis added).
9' See id. at 14.
98 See id. (citing Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880)).
99 See In re Estate of Wilson, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 1236 (N.Y. 1983) ("Nor is the State
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[state] action is to deny rights subject to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment,
it is the obligation of this Court to enforce the constitutional demands."' 0
In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,'0' the plaintiff challenged that the
Supreme Court of Delaware erred by refusing to find his equal protection rights were
violated when a restaurant leasing public property and entitled to state agency
maintenance services discriminated against him and other black customers. 2 The
Delaware court had held that Eagle Coffee Shoppe, though leasing its location from
Wilmington Parking Authority, was acting solely in a private capacity when it
refused to serve black customers, more particularly, the plaintiff, Mr. Clark." 3 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that "[b]y its inaction, the Authority, and through
it the State, has not only made itself a party to the refusal of service [based upon
race], but has elected to place its power, property and prestige hehind the admitted
discrimination."'" The circumstances surrounding the Parking Authority's
"interdependence" with the restaurant that discriminated led the Court to find that the
discrimination involved was not "'purely private"' and, therefore, violated the
Fourteenth Amendment.' 05
In the context of trusts, as in the context of the leasing agreement in Burton,
courts should not measure the degree state action by the mere language of the
instrument involved."°6 The participation of a state agency with a private restaurant
in Burton was sufficient to allow the Court to look to the substance, not the form, of
the "nonobvious involvement of the State."'0 7 Courts, therefore, must look to the
facts and circumstances surrounding the creation, implementation, administration,
and supervision of discriminatory trust provisions when determining whether those
provisions violate the Fourteenth Amendment."8
under an affirmative obligation to prevent purely private discrimination.").
'~ Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (emphasis added). See also Wilson, 452
N.E.2d at 1236 (noting that the state is responsible for private discrimination when its actions
have "the effect of compelling the private discrimination").
'0' 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
102 See id. at 816.
03 See id. at 721.
104 Id. at 725.
1os Id.
106 See, e.g., Milford Trust Co. v. Stabler, 301 A.2d 534, 573 (Del. Ch. 1973) (holding that
the court could not instruct a trustee to follow the racially discriminatory terms in an
educational trust, therefore, the trustee should implement the trust without racial restrictions).
According to the Court of Chancery of Delaware, "[a] judge is such an officer [bound by the
law against discrimination] and he may not take any judicial action based upon racial
discrimination." Id. at 536 (emphasis added) (citing Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); State v. Brown, 195 A.2d 379 (Del. 1963)).
07 Burton, 365 U.S. at 722 (attributing "its true significance" to the action of the state).
'08 See Milford, 301 A.2d at 573.
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The principles underlying the Civil Rights Cases of 188309 established that
private discrimination does not impinge on the Fourteenth Amendment as established
in Shelley v. Kraemer;n. however, these cases can be read to suggest a standard by
which courts should find state action and responsibility sufficient to invalidate
discriminatory private trusts. The Supreme Court posed the rhetorical question in
Shelley v. Kraemer of whether any judicial action that furthers private discrimination
is state action."' The Court also stated in Shelley that "[s]tate action, as that phrase
is understood for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, refers to exertions of
state power in all forms."' l 2 In addition, the Court asserted that the Fourteenth
Amendment is not inoperative simply because an incident of discrimination arose
from private agreements." 3 The extension of these rationales led to a conclusion that
the enforcement of restrictions defined by private individuals amounts to state
participation in discrimination." 4
IV. PRIVATE TRUSTS CONVERGE WITH THE PUBLIC ARENA
One commentator made the argument that determining the quality of state action
becomes a problem "of defining the constitutionally prescribed line between the
individual and the state."' '" The Supreme Court acknowledged that line in Shelley."6
As of yet, however, courts have been reluctant to judge state action that permits,
acquiesces in, or facilitates private discrimination as crossing that line and violating
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court resolved this line-drawing problem correctly
and in accordance with public policy in In re Girard's Estate"' by holding that a
court's substitution of a private trustee for public, city trustees-previously involved
109 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
110 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (refusing to enforce restrictive covenants prohibiting occupancy of
house in neighborhood by African-Americans).
.. See Clark, supra note 20, at 983.
112 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (stating that any action in the context of
actors which are the legislature, judiciary, and executive is state action).
"' See id. (stating further that an action arising out of the common law policy of a state
is not immune from Fourteenth Amendment).
114 See id. at 13-14 (distinguishing between the validity of the agreements which contained
discriminatory provisions under the Fourteenth Amendment and the illegal judicial
enforcement of the terms to effectuate the discriminatory purpose of the agreement). As long
as individuals alone promote the discriminatory purposes of the agreements by voluntary
adherence to the terms, no violation has occurred.
" David S. Elkind, Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions
to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 656, 656 (1974).
116 See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13-14.
117 127 A.2d 287 (Pa. 1956), rev'd sub nom., Pennsylvania v. Board of Dirs. of City
Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
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in the administration and maintenance of a private trust providing for the education
of "poor male white orphan children" of Philadelphia-rose to the level of
unconstitutional state action." '8 The Supreme Court, however, consistently has been
hesitant to find governmental regulation as sufficient state action in private acts." 9
Another issue that arises in this context concerns the point at which application
of the common law may become state action. Because the right of disposition and
the concept of the trust originated at common law, state law grants individuals the
privilege to determine the fate of their property. The overwhelming majority of
courts have held that mere codification of the common law does not constitute state
action within the meaniing of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 The dichotomy between
passive state action and active state involvement has become the deciding factor in
determining whether states participate sufficiently to modify the common law that
may violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court
anticipated this dilemma in Shelley. The Court addressed this problem in the context
of judicial enforcement of common law rules or substantive due process.
Enforcement by state courts of common law rules can constitute impermissible state
action. "
Under this rationale, state court enforcement and facilitation of discriminatory
private trusts may be sufficient state action to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
The effect of court administration that modifies a trust to effectuate private
discrimination by allowing the trust to continue is to allow courts to sanction
discrimination and enforce the discriminatory provisions by compelling a trustee to
comply with the discriminatory terms of a trust. This effect denies protected rights
and was prohibited by the Supreme Court as constituting improper state action in
Shelley because it "bears the clear and unmistakable imprimatur of the State."'2
11 Id at 288. See also Pennsylvania v. Brown, 392 F.2d 120, 125 (3d Cir.) ("The action
in this instance [of Girard's will] and its motivation are to put it mildly, conspicuous. And
what happened to Girard does '.. . significantly encourage and involve the State in private
discriminations."' (quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 381 (1967))).
9 See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (holding that regulation of the
Lodge by an alcohol license was not sufficient for a finding of state action in the Lodge's
discrimination against African-Americans).
"' See, e.g., King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 330 A.2d 1, 7 (N.J. 1974) (stating that
"[c]odification is merely a legislative reorganization of existing law into acceptable statutory
form" concerning a due process challenge to repossession of a car); Kennebec, Inc. v. Bank
of the West, 565 P.2d 812 (Wash. 1977) (holding that a legislative act providing for
nonjudicial foreclosure of deeds of trust did not violate due process because the mere
enactment of the statute was not sufficient state action).
21 See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 17.
.22 Id at 20. The Supreme Court imposed an affirmative obligation on courts to prevent
exactly this type of effect. See id
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Such action also would violate state constitutional mandates against discrimination
based on race or gender.'23
A. Classification of Discriminatory Private Trusts
Courts have declined to use public policy principles to eliminate discriminatory
trust provisions because of the lack of a system by which to determine when such
discrimination converges with public functions to violate equal protection guarantees.
Courts should not prohibit purely private discrimination that does not involve any
state action. For example, if a settlor creates an inter vivos trust for the benefit of his
son and names himself trustee, but provides upon his death for the corpus of the trust
to pass to his son unrestricted, courts may not restrict his freedom to determine the
terms of the trust. Because the settlor is trustee, his own discriminatory intent will
not be enforced by the court. Such an inter vivos trust would not involve a third
party trustee or court administration. Direct delivery of the monetary benefit of the
trust from the settlor to the beneficiary would not involve action subject to
eradication, even though the discrimination is egregious.
Under a different scenario such as the initial hypothetical of this Note, a testator
could create a testamentary trust that requires court administration to become
effective of to continue. In addition to court involvement, the trust may require a
third party trustee. In order for the trust to survive, the court must compel the trustee
to act in accordance with the discriminatory terms of the trust. If the trustee has a
duty to discriminate, it derives from the authority of the court. The court compels the
trustee to perform his discriminatory duties. In that situation, the court would force
others to discriminate based upon state authority and state law. Courts should
eliminate discriminatory provisions from private trusts whenever, as in Shelley, the
court would be placed in the position of enforcing or facilitating discriminatory
duties. This basic distinction provides the framework in which courts may exercise
their discretion based on public policy mandates against discrimination.
V. BALANCING THE TESTATOR'S INTERESTS WITH THE INTERESTS OF SOCIETY TO
PREVENT DISCRIMINATION 124
Societal values concerning racial and gender discrimination are reflected in the
context of charitable trusts. 25 Some sources attribute the "lack of [clear] direction"
123 The New Jersey Constitution does not have a state action requirement. See David J.
Fine et al., Project Report, Toward an Activist Role For State Bill of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 271, 338 (1973).
124 See L. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 426 (3d ed. 1986).
125 See Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1160 (D.D.C.), af'd sub nom. Coit v.
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
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to the competing interests presented between society, the testator, and the
beneficiaries.'26 In this balancing test, however, the interests presented by society,
the state, and the beneficiaries in eradicating discrimination should prevail:
The constitutional strength of the government's interest in preventing
even private racial discrimination is underscored by the recent decision
in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., interpreting the Civil Rights Act of
1866, wherein that interest was held to prevail over the ordinary liberty
of a citizen to buy and sell land and other property.'
Courts should extend this principle io private trusts that contain discriminatory
provisions and that require court administration, facilitation, or acquiescence to
operate. In other contexts, courts have refused to enforce trust provisions in violation
of public policies against restraints on marriage and encouragement of divorce.12,
A. State Responsibility
29
Actions by state entities to promote, acquiesce in, and validate discrimination in
private trusts are unlawful and violate courts' duties to follow antidiscrimination
policies. Under traditional trust law, a court's responsibility is to divine the intent of
the testator and implement that purpose if it is not illegal or impossible. 30 Respect
may be accorded to the intentions of testators; however, courts and states should have
affirmative duties to prevent racial and gender discrimination in private trusts. The
New York Court of Appeals in In re Estate of Wilson held that no affirmative duty
exists on the part of the state to prevent "purely private discrimination."'' In the
trust context, discriminatory provisions may come from the terms of a testator's will
126 See, e.g., Swanson, supra note 6, at 156.
27 Connally, 330 F. Supp. at 1163 (citations omitted). The court in Connally held:
"Racially discriminatory institutions may not validly be established or maintained even under
the common law pertaining to educational charities." Id at 1160. See also 2 GEORGE
GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 328
(2d ed. rev. 1977). The trends reflected in charitable trust law must continue to develop and
extend to private trust law.
2' See Matter of Liberman, 18 N.E.2d 658 (N.Y. 1939) (provision restricting the right to
marry); Matter of Haight, 64 N.Y.S. 1029 (N.Y. App. Div. 1900) (provision encouraging
divorce).
29 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
130 See First Nat'l Bank of Kansas City v. Danforth, 523 S.W.2d 808, 815-16 (Mo. 1975).
"1' 452 N.E.2d 1228, 1236 (N.Y. 1983) (stressing that state abstention from participation
and further allowance of private discrimination did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment).
See also DeShaney v. Winnebego County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (holding
that states have no affirmative duty to aid in a case in which the state did not act to remove
a child from his father's custody after complaints of child abuse were filed).
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or a settlor's trust document; however, unlike a purely private act of discrimination,
the privilege to produce the discriminatory provisions originates from common law
and has been codified by state trust law. State courts are the mechanisms for
administration and enforcement of the discrimination. Professor Richelle Searing's
proposition in her article, Discriminatory Charitable Trusts: The Role of
Approximation and the Fourteenth Amendment, substantiates this view: "Thus, a
state that allows a discriminatory provision in a charitable trust to stand-be it racial,
gender, or religious--can be seen as perpetuating discrimination."'3 Professor
Searing continues to emphasize the egregious consequences of state validation and
enforcement of discrimination in trust provisions:
It is important to note that dead hand control of property that fosters racial
discrimination is particularly harmful because it imposes the grantor's
discriminatory views on future generations. Moreover, the chance of
success for this type of discriminatory exclusion is greater when the state
refuses to invoke cy pres, allowing the trust to remain forever
discriminatory.'33
The lasting consequences of trust discrimination are severe, especially in light of the
fact that court validation of trusts with discriminatory provisions imposes substantial
burdens on future generations.' Even though private trusts are not exempt from the
Rule Against Perpetuities-unlike charitable trusts, which may operate for an infinite
amount of time-their infringement on individual rights and promulgation of
discrimination has just as severe an effect.
B. Application of State Action Analysis to Private Trusts
State action is a separate test used to determine the constitutionality of a trust
provision.'35 Because state action analysis incorporates numerous approaches, courts
can tailor their evaluation of the facts surrounding discriminatory private trusts to
arrive at equitable outcomes. The Supreme Court in Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority cited Cooper v. Aaron'36 for the proposition that the state is responsible
whenever "'state participation [emerges] through any arrangement, management,
132 Searing, supra note 57, at 290.
3 Id. But see Raskin, supra note 62, at 300 (commenting on the reconciliation of the
Johnson and Wilson cases: "Judicial application of trust principles that permit, but do not
encourage, promote or compel private discrimination on the basis of gender does not
constitute state action violative of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment").
131 See Searing, supra note 57, at 290.
131 See Milford Trust Co. v. Stabler, 301 A.2d 534, 536 (Del. Ch. 1973).
136 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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funds or property."" 37 Incorporating this view of state involvement in private acts
of discrimination using trust provisions, any action of the state, including
administration of a testamentary estate, that sets up a discriminatory private trust
would violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
The opposing view counters that "[w]hen the state regulates private
conduct.., it may be held responsible for private discrimination in the regulated
field 'only when enforcement of its regulation has the effect of compelling the private
discrimination.""33 This proposition does not hold the state responsible for blatant
discrimination in private trusts or for state condonement and management of that
discrimination because the legislature does not expressly forbid discriminatory trust
provisions.
Courts have a mechanism available to rectify the effects of discriminatory trust
provisions by invalidating them under the auspices of public policy
antidiscrimination mandates and the illegality of state preservation of discrimination.
This rule would allow courts to make case-by-case determinations concerning
discriminatory private trust provisions to balance mitigating factors. Such factors
include remedial measures for past discrimination often used in educational trusts to
provide scholarship funds for women and minorities. In addition, courts may
consider whether an absolute lack of state action exists in relation to the trust.
Typically, purely private discrimination does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court proposed the view in the Civil Rights Cases that "[i]ndividual invasion of
individual rights is not the subject matter of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment."' But
states should, and do, have affirmative duties to strike racially and sexually
discriminatory provisions from private trusts and implement the testator's intent "as
near as" possible, in light of principles underlying the cy pres doctrine, without the
discriminatory terms. 40
In Shelley v. Kraemer4' and Barrows v. Jackson,' the Court promoted a broad
interpretation of state action that courts should extend to eliminate the state action
requirement in cases involving private discriminatory trusts. As of yet though, the
Supreme Court has refused to apply this broad interpretation to trusts, even though
no definitive test for state action as applied to private conduct exists.
137 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (emphasis added)
(quoting Cooper, 358 U.S. at 4).
138 Raskin, supra note 62, at 311 (quoting In re Estate of Wilson, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 1236
(N.Y. 1983)).
139 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
40 This proposal incorporates invalidation of the discriminatory terms and implementation
of the trust in accordance with the policies surrounding cy pres and the doctrine's application
to charitable trusts.
14 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
142 346 U.S. 249 (1953). See Raskin, supra note 62, at 301-02.
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C. The Effect Test: Courts Have Become the Validating and Enforcing Mechanisms
for Discrimination Through Private Trust Provisions
Courts must focus on the consequences of state action when determining whether
discriminatory provisions of private trusts implicate state action. By allowing
discriminatory trusts to pass through court administration and become active, the
judiciary sanctions discriminatory conduct. State laws also affirmatively provide
testators with the ability to effectuate their discrimination through inter vivos
trusts-whether funded during the testator's life or by a testamentary pourover.
Courts and states have developed intricate policies sanctioning discrimination in trust
law. 143
Courts act unlawfully even through acquiescence to state laws providing the
ability to discriminate. In its discussion of Burton, the Supreme Court of Missouri
observed in Shapiro v. Columbia Union National Bank and Trust Co.'44 that
"[a]lthough the state neither commanded or expressly authorized or encouraged
discrimination, the state by its inaction made itself a party to the refusal of services
which could not be considered the purely private choice of the restaurant operator."
145
The inaction of the judiciary in the context of discriminatory private trust provisions
makes the state a party to the discrimination. Courts shield and sanction gender and
racial discrimination by validating testamentary trusts in probate proceedings and by
acquiescing in and enforcing discriminatory provisions in inter vivos trusts. This
connection with the state as the final or only barrier before a trust becomes active
violates the strict public policy against discrimination and the Fourteenth
Amendment.
1. The Equal Protection Clause
Though the Fourteenth Amendment does not allow courts or other state actors
to sanction the private invasion of individual rights, the Amendment does prohibit
private discrimination if state action is involved, because it specifically refers to "no
State" in its language. The Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution provides:
See generally Pennsylvania v. Brown, 270 F. Supp. 782, 790 (E.D. Pa. 1967) ("[T]he
involvement (between the state and the discriminating facility) exists [no matter what form
it takes] and that it lends sustenance, actual or apparent, to a policy of discrimination."),
aftid, 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968)). The court in Brown held
that the transfer to a private trustee of control over the racially discriminatory trust did not
remove the state from involvement in the discriminatory purposes and policies. See id.
144 576 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979).
141 Id. at 319 (addressing a female law student's claim that she was denied aid from a
charitable trust established for the benefit of males).
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[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. 46
States act only through theirjudiciary, legislative, and executive offices and agents. 47
A judge is an officer of the state and, therefore, a court may not order others to honor
racially discriminatory trusts even if the trusts are private.'48 For this reason, the state
action test is a test independent of constitutionality. "'
D. Traditional Trust Law
The common law governing trusts and disposition of property gives testators and
settlors free reign over the terms and beneficiaries of these instruments. Delaware
trust law also extends to testators and settlors the unequivocal right to dispose of
property even if the private individuals use state law and the judiciary to activate and
implement the discriminatory terms, because
as a matter of [Delaware] state trust law, a testator or trustor may cause
the creation of a private trust for the benefit of one race just so long as the
state does not become so involved in the affairs of such a legal entity as
to run afoul of the constitutional guarantees of the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 50
Because society abhors discrimination in any form, and federal law prohibits
discrimination by state actors, any action by states implicates them and runs afoul of
the underlying principles of the Fourteenth Amendment. Applying the effect test
enumerated above to state action in the context of private trusts demonstrates that
judiciary inaction and administration of discriminatory trusts mandates racial and
gender discrimination as a consequence.
146 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
' See In re Will of Potter, 275 A.2d 574, 582 (Del. Ch. 1970) (citing Exparte Virginia,
100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879)).
148 See Milford Trust Co. v. Stabler, 301 A.2d 534, 536 (Del. Ch. 1973) (reading the trust
without the race restriction).
149 See id. at 537.
50 Will of Potter, 275 A.2d at 579.
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CONCLUSION
In some instances, courts will not enforce provisions in violation of public
policy. 5' Though courts use their power to restrict disposition based on public policy
sparingly, public policy can limit the manner of disposition of property though a
testator or settlor has the right to bequeath the property.'52 Even though many courts
admit that some trust restrictions are contrary to public policy, the judiciary remains
reluctant to review these provisions."' This neutral reaction to the central public
policy doctrine surrounding case law is an anomaly because courts traditionally have
had the authority to invalidate trusts designed to accomplish ends contrary to public
policy even though the trust purposes are not illegal.'54
A consideration of the Restatement's views on the role of public policy's ability
to restrain personal conduct and dictate "constructional preferences" elucidates the
movement toward compliance with public policy mandates in trust and property
law.'55 The Restatement specifically considers the implications of and need for
restrictions on disposition:
American law curtails freedom of disposition only to the extent that
the donor attempts to make a disposition or achieve a purpose that is
prohibited or restricted by an overriding rule of law. The term "rule of
law" is used in a broad sense to include rules and principles derived from
the U.S. Constitution, a state constitution, or public policy ... 16
In addition, "impermissible racial or other categoric restrictions" are "[a]mong the
rules of law that prohibit or restrict freedom of disposition in certain instances."'
157
The Restatement specifically identifies a preference for construction of "donative
'5' See In re Estate of Walker, 476 N.E.2d 298, 301 (N.Y. 1985) (supporting the view that
restrictions on the right to marry and provisions encouraging divorce or separation are void
as against public policy).
152 See id.
13 As applied in the context of a charitable trust containing gender restrictions, "[a]
provision in a charitable trust, however, that is central to the testator's or settlor's charitable
purpose, and is not illegal, should not be invalidated on public policy grounds unless that
provision, if given effect, would substantially mitigate the general charitable effect of the
gift." In re Estate of Wilson, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 (N.Y. 1983) (citing 4 AUSTIN
WAKEFIELD SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 399.4 (3d ed. 1967) (detailing a reluctance to
expunge restrictions based on public policy)).
"4 See Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1159-60 (D.D.C.), aff'dsub nom. Coit v.
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
"' RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.3 cmt. m (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 1995).
56 Id. at § 10.1 cmt. c.
157 Id.
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dispositions" in agreement with public policy. 5 Even the Restatement (Second) of
Propery: Donative Transfers contains an entire division devoted to social and
personal restrictions imposed by donative transfers." 9 Courts could refuse to enforce
racial restrictions based on this public policy. 60
According to Professor Stephen R. Swanson, "[d]espite this strong public policy
against racial discrimination, apparently no court has invalidated a racially
discriminatory trust on grounds of public policy."'' It is time for courts to use their
discretionary powers to invalidate discriminatory trust provisions in private trusts in
accordance with well established public policy abhorring racial and gender
discrimination.
62
Misuse of state privileges to compel and to extend private discrimination limits
the liberties of individuals and strikes at the heart of the Equal Protection Clause of
the United States Constitution and state constitutions. Public policy alone should be
sufficient to invalidate racially and sexually discriminatory private trust provisions.' 63
Though state law provides individuals the freedom to bequeath property and to
establish trusts (evolved from the Statute of Wills and Statute of Uses), these laws
and liberties cannot permit testators to rule with dead hands and restrict the lives and
liberties of others. Although society previously tolerated private discrimination,
changing values should dictate the course of the common law:
.58 Id. at § 11.3 cmt. m.
' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS pt. 3 (1983).
.6 See id. (stating explicitly that an ambiguous restriction that "might plausibly be
construed either to impose or not to impose a discriminatory restriction deemed to be against
public policy, such as one promoting racial injustice, should, unless overcome by evidence
of a contrary intention, be construed against imposing such a restriction"). The section
expands upon that constructional preference to discuss complete elimination of provisions
for reasons of public policy.
161 Swanson, supra note 6, at 160 (advocating a solution for the problem of discrimination
in charitable trusts "by excluding from the definition of charitable any trust that discriminates
on the basis of sex or race").
162 See generally Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1159 (D.D.C.) (citing 4 G.
BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 369, at 63 (2d ed. 1964); 4 SCOTT, supra
note 127, § 368, at 2855-56, aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971)).
Developments in the application of tax exemption requirements for charitable trusts
demonstrate the continuing trend prohibiting racial discrimination in the trust context. The
IRS changed its policy regarding charitable trusts by mandating that private schools that
discriminate on the basis of race fail the requirements to qualify for tax exempt status as a per
se rule. This approach fundamentally alters the common law definition of "charitable" to
exclude any discriminatory purposes contained within those trusts. See Connally, 330 F.
Supp. at 1156.
163 But cf Swanson, supra note 6, at 160 (stating that "public policy considerations alone
do not justify either invalidating or modifying a racially discriminatory trust").
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Our society permits discrimination in the private sector in recognizing that
the nature of human beings is to associate with, and confer benefits upon,
other human beings and institutions of their own choosing. Such private
decision-making is a part of daily life in any society. However, when the
decision-making mechanism, as here, is so entwined with public
institutions and government, discrimination becomes the policy statement
and product of society itself and cannot stand against the strong and
enlightened language of our Constitution.'64
States should not act in ways that preserve discrimination merely because courts hide
behind traditional common law approaches codified by state trust laws to ignore the
pervasive problems of discrimination. Courts should eliminate discriminatory
provisions in private trusts and implement the testator's intended bequest absent
discriminatory restrictions.
KATHRYN F. VOYER
" In re Certain Scholarship Funds, 575 A.2d 1325, 1329-30 (N.H. 1990).
1999]
